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Catastrophic disasters require federal and state entities to marshal a
tremendous amount of resources. Areas affected by such disasters need
food, water, medicine, and shelter. Often, they also need heightened
security. While these tasks differ in principle, they are much harder to
separate in practice. Currently, members of the military may provide
disaster relief but they generally cannot enforce laws in disaster stricken
areas. This division of labor makes sense only where states are able to
handle the disruption by the normal operation of law. But where a disaster
threatens to overwhelm state resources, states should be able to request
military law enforcement as part of the disaster relief effort. As such, the
argument is not about expanding the military's domestic powers, but about
reorganizing some of its current powers under the rubric of disaster relief
I. INTRODUCTION
After Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, another
storm began to form as the public grew frustrated with the apparent inability
of the government to offer disaster relief.' The scale of the damage caused in
Louisiana and Mississippi was unprecedented in recent times but by no
means unanticipated, as government agencies had predicted the potential of
such natural disasters via computer models.2 Thus, images of hurricane
victims stranded without food, water, and medical care nearly a week after
the first day of the storm shocked many viewers. Reports of random violence
and images of looting further stoked public outrage. Seemingly, the only
branch of government that garnered praise was the military. In one poll,
General Russel Honore, the commander in charge of the Joint Task Force,
was voted by far the most effective government figure to emerge from the
disaster response effort.3
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1 Manuel Roig-Franzia & Spencer Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still
Waiting, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al.
2 Eric Lipton, White House Was Told Hurricane Posed Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2006, at A14; Computer Models Predicted Disaster: New Orleans Scenario 'Well
Anticipated,' Experts Say, So What Happened?, MSNBC.coM, Sept. 2, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9175204.
3 Op-Ed., Posse Comitatus, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Sept. 26, 2005, at B6.
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the public outcry, the President
and some in his administration suggested that a broader role for the military
might be needed in the future to cope more effectively with large-scale
disasters. George W. Bush declared that "a challenge on this scale requires
greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces-the
institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations
on a moment's notice."4 Members of Congress have also declared their
interest in giving the armed forces a greater role in dealing with natural and
human-made disasters.5 The push for a larger domestic role for the military
persists even though some commentators doubt its necessity. One common
observation is that nothing in federal law prevents the chief executive from
effectively deploying the military in case of a domestic disaster.6
This Note addresses the current debate about whether further
liberalization of laws governing the domestic use of the military is necessary
to ensure more effective disaster response. It argues that although the various
laws and regulations could be read to allow the President full use of armed
forces to respond to a disaster, the hodgepodge manner of achieving this
result is not very helpful to disaster responders or victims. The Note also
goes on to suggest a legislative solution largely unexplored by authors
discussing the role of the military in domestic affairs.
Part II sets out the general rule against military involvement in domestic
affairs contained in the Posse Comitatus Act and gives the rationale for
excluding the military from civilian life. Following this are relevant judicial
interpretations of the restrictive statute and some exceptions to the
restrictions.
Part III introduces the Stafford Act, which provides for military
assistance in domestic disasters. After introducing the Stafford Act, this Part
discusses two important aspects of disaster response: the status of the
National Guard and the state-triggered provisions of the Stafford Act. Part IV
examines the challenges of applying the Posse Comitatus Act in disasters
requiring military personnel under the Stafford Act. It concludes that the
appropriate legislative response to Hurricane Katrina is more clarity in the
law governing military assistance, not more power to the military. While lack
4 George W. Bush, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation
(Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO5/09/2OO50915-8.html#;
Julian E. Barnes & Kenneth T. Walsh, A Uniform Response?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 3, 2005, at 28; G. Robert Hillman, Military Seeks National Plan for Disasters,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2005, at 1A.
5 Letter from Sen. John Warner, Chairman, Armed Forces Comm., to Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 14, 2005) (on file with author) (urging greater role
for the military in large-scale disasters).
6 John Yoo, Trigger Power, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5.
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of power does not appear to be the problem, disaster relief presents
challenges not adequately addressed by the current law. Although some
authors have observed that the Stafford Act contains no exceptions to the
Posse Comitatus Act, and others have incorrectly called the Stafford Act an
exception, the next section discusses the possibility of law and order as
disaster relief. Part V argues that incorporating exceptions to the Posse
Comitatus Act into the Stafford Act, the principle disaster relief statute,
would help clarify this area of law for both the military and civilians.
II. THE LAW GOVERNING DOMESTIC USE OF THE MILITARY
In 1878, Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), a law that
presently criminalizes military law enforcement. Any legislative attempts to
involve the military in domestic affairs today must factor this prohibition into
its regulative framework . The following section introduces the statutory
7 See, for example, 6 U.S.C. § 466(a)-(b) (Supp. III 2003), which provide the
framework for Homeland Security:
(1) Section 1385 of title 18 (commonly known as the "Posse Comitatus Act")
prohibits the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws
except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or
Act of Congress.
(2) Enacted in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act was expressly intended to
prevent United States Marshals, on their own initiative, from calling on the Army
for assistance in enforcing Federal law.
(3) The Posse Comitatus Act has served the Nation well in limiting the use of
the Armed Forces to enforce the law.
(4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a
complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range of domestic purposes,
including law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is
authorized by Act of Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed
Forces is required to fulfill the President's obligations under the Constitution to
respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious emergency.
(5) Existing laws, including chapter 15 of title 10 (commonly known as the
"Insurrection Act"), and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may
be invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the
Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and these laws specifically authorize the
President to use the Armed Forces to help restore public order.
(b) Sense of Congress
Congress reaffirms the continued importance of section 1385 of title 18, and it
is the sense of Congress that nothing in this chapter should be construed to alter the
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language of this provision, its subsequent interpretation by the courts, and
some exceptions to the rule. Within the exceptions, which vary in scope, this
Note identifies a common and commonsensical thread of permitting military
law enforcement to the extent necessary to preserve certain constitutional
rights, to protect property, and to save life. Necessity in this context indicates
the failure or inability of state and local authorities to provide these
functions.
A. Posse Comitatus Act
Conceptually, the law governing the domestic use of the military for any
purpose begins with the PCA.8 The term "posse comitatus" literally means
the power of the county, or that population of the county whom a sheriff may
summon for assistance. 9 Although the PCA only mentions the Army and Air
Force, Department of Defense regulations apply the PCA to the Navy and
Marines. 0 According to its placement in the United States Code, the PCA is
a criminal statute, but no one has ever been convicted of violating the law."
Instead, the PCA has come to codify a general principle against the domestic
use of the military to carry out civilian laws. In this way, the PCA is said to
establish civilian supremacy over the military. This clear division of labor is
not always supported by actual practice, but because the statute specifically
provides for Congress to create exceptions, Congress has not felt obliged to
change the PCA.
12
applicability of such section to any use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to
execute the laws.
8 The Posse Comitatus Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (8th ed. 2004) ("A group of citizens who are
called together to help the sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue operations.").
10 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIREcTIVE 5552.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS para. E4.3 (1986), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5525-5.pdf [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 5525.5].
11 DONALD J. CURRIER, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: A HARMLESS RELIC FROM THE
POST-RECONSTRUCTION ERA OR A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO TRANSFORMATION? 15, 24
(2003), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA417183.
12 Matthew Carlton Hammond, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of
Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 955, 969-70 (1997). But see H.R. 4240, 109th Cong.
§ 5 (1st Sess. 2005) (allowing the military to enforce the law "at or near a border of the
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While the wording of the PCA remains essentially identical to the
original, its relevance has varied over time. 13 The PCA's inconsistent
application is a direct result of the tradeoffs inherent in the domestic use of
the military. On one hand, the discipline and efficiency of federal troops
renders the military an attractive option in many domestic situations. 14 In
other respects, engaging civilians with troops trained to fight enemies raises
serious questions for civilians and the military.' 5 The PCA's continued
relevance owes to the questions raised by and the need for recurrent
involvement of the military in domestic affairs. These tensions, always
present in the debate about domestic military use, were anticipated by events
surrounding the passage of the Act.
1. Background
The politics and problems of the post-Reconstruction Era provided much
of the impetus for the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act.16 After the Civil
War and prior to the PCA, federal troops remained in the South to safeguard
elections, enforce the voting rights of former slaves, and maintain general
order.' 7 Even after the military officially pulled out, the army was repeatedly
used throughout the South to maintain peace and order among warring
political parties and to watch over elections. 18 Southern Democrats especially
resented the presence of troops under a Republican administration.' 9
Although other members of Congress showed concern over the heavy
reliance on the Army for extended periods, the Act did not pass until the
United States in order to prevent aliens not permitted by law to enter the United States,
terrorists, and drug smugglers from entering the United States").
13 See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948) (commenting on
the PCA as an "obscure and all-but-forgotten statute"); Nathan Canestaro, Homeland
Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99,
99-100 (2003) (highlighting some of the inconsistent attitudes towards the PCA).
14 See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN
DOMESTIC DISORDERS 1789-1878, 268-87 (1988).
15 Id. at 143.
16 The First Circuit went so far as to call the Act a "backwash of the Reconstruction
period." Chandler, 171 F.2d at 936. For a fuller discussion of the PCA's contested past,
see James P. O'Shaughnessy, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics
Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 703 (1976); see also Bonnie Baker, The Origins of
the Posse Comitatus Act, in THE POSSE COM1TATUs ACT AND RELATED MATTERS:
CURRENT ISSUES AND BACKGROUND 1, 1-6 (Susan Boriotti & Donna Dennis eds., 2004)
(discussing relevant legislative history).
17 COAKLEY, supra note 14, at 268-87.
18 CURRIER, supra note 11, at 4-6 (describing the Reconstruction Era experience of
Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina).
19 1d.
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constitutional and congressional power to override its restrictions was made
explicit.
20
Additionally, before the PCA, U.S. Marshals across the country had the
power to summon army members in their territory to arrest criminals and
carry out other law enforcement activities. 21 This practice grew out of a 1789
law authorizing marshals to organize and lead militias to enforce civil laws.
Somewhat awkwardly, it was justified by the argument that soldiers called to
police civilians were called as citizens, not as soldiers, even if on active duty
at the time.22 Both military personnel and civilians came to disapprove of
using active-duty soldiers in this way, especially when marshals began to
enforce fugitive slave laws in non-slave holding states.23
The Posse Comitatus Act was the culmination of these varied and often
directly opposed forces and interests.24 Proponents of liberalizing the
application of the PCA point out the limited nature of the PCA's origins to
suggest narrowing its current scope. In particular, they note the ignoble and
discriminatory intentions behind the desire to ban federal troops from
enforcing civil laws. Even then, some commentators argue that the PCA
merely codified the resistance of civilians to what effectively amounted to
martial law.25 Those who believe the PCA should be strictly enforced see the
Act as quasi-constitutional, the codification of a long history of American




Regardless of where one traces the roots of the PCA, three reasons help
to explain its continued relevance. Perhaps the best-known rationale is the
2 0 Id. at5.
21 Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the
Military to Execute Civilian Law, in THE POSSE COMITATUs ACT AND RELATED
MATTERS: CURRENT ISSUES AND BACKGROUND 17, 24 (Susan Boriotti & Donna Dennis
eds., 2004).
22 Id.
23 COAKLEY, supra note 14, at 343.
24 Sean J. O'Hara, Comment, The Posse Comitatus Act Applied to the Prosecution
of Civilians, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 767, 770-71 (2005). The PCA reversed trends towards
more liberal use of the military, so its historical roots have also been traced back even
further to the Revolutionary Period. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 12, at 956.
25 See CURRIER, supra note 11, at 1.
26 See generally Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of
Civilian Control of the US. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341, 341-47, 392 (1994)
(warning about the use of the military for "quixotic" domestic security).
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fear of forfeiting civil liberties to a powerful centralized government, a
rationale based partly on federalism and partly on a general distrust of a
militarized society.27 Because the military is a branch of the federal
government, and perceives itself as an institution insulated from the political
process, it sits twice removed from the local concerns and sensitivities of
citizens. Therefore, it has traditionally been seen as less amenable and
responsive to those concerns. Civil liberties are thus entrusted to civilian
leaders who must remain supreme to the military. By removing the military
from law enforcement, the PCA is said to maintain civilian control over the
military.
28
Another rationale for the PCA is that it preserves the military's scarce
resources. As an institution, the military must be protected from spreading
itself too thin.29 Precisely because the military is so organized and effective,
politicians and other authorities are tempted to use it for many purposes.3 °
Even where this is politically expedient, the military is not always eager to
expand its role. With regard to missions abroad, military commanders may
be reluctant to take on certain operations, but legal restrictions usually do not
prevent them from undertaking the operation. At home, the PCA may pose a
legal obstacle to policy makers wishing to commit the military to a particular
course of action, and many inside and outside the military view this potential
obstacle as an energy and resource saving device.31
Lastly, the PCA recognizes the limits of military training and seeks to
prevent confusing combat-trained troops by placing them in essentially
32policing functions. Soldiers train to engage enemies, not citizens with
established constitutional rights to due process, reasonable searches and
seizures, as well as other constitutional safeguards. Moreover, the violence
necessary against enemies may be counterproductive in addition to being
27 See, e.g., Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to
Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 383, 400, 442 (2003).
28 Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'don reh'g, 800 F.2d
812 (8th Cir. 1986), affd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988); Dunlap, supra note 26, at 343-44.
29 See Michael T. Cunningham, The Military's Involvement in Law Enforcement:
The Threat is Not What You Think, 26 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 699, 711-14 (2003). For the
author, the promise of politicians to refrain from adversely affecting the primary task of
the military by more non-traditional missions ignores reality. Id. at 711.
30 Id.
31 Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight
on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage is Done, 175
MIL. L. REV. 86, 149 (2003); CURRIER, supra note 11, at 11.
32 Kealy, supra note 27, at 429, 441.
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dangerous in the context of civilians. 33 Those trained to police civilians are
taught to use force gradually and to produce admissible evidence. For
soldiers trained to search and destroy, the demands of gathering and
preserving such evidence may not always be apparent. It is also noteworthy
that some in the military frown on "soft missions" exactly because such
missions require the military to deemphasize its war-fighting capacity, out of
the fear that it would somehow soften the troops or confuse their training.34
B. Interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act
The three rationales for the PCA appear to warrant a broad construction,
but courts have not been as expansive.35 Although courts have not convicted
anyone for violating the PCA, they have found violations of the statute to
defeat government claims in which the lawful exercise of power constituted
an element of the offense.36 To determine whether there has been a violation,
courts must first decide whom the PCA prohibits, as the statutory language
only mentions the Army and the Air Force; however, Department of Defense
regulations apply the PCA's restrictions to the Navy and the Marine Corps.37
33 See, e.g., Jesse Katz, A Good Shepherd's Death, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al
(reporting on the accidental death of a shepherd along the U.S.-Mexico border).
Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, is quoted as saying the military
"is trained to vaporize, not Mirandize." Douglas Holt, DA Questions Military Account of
Border Slaying; Drug Unit Spokeswoman Calls Remarks Surprising, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 4, 1997, at 1A. In a debate after Hurricane Katrina, Korb took the position of
giving the military a greater role in major disasters. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Send
in the Military (PBS television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005). Importantly, Korb explained
his original comment related to border patrol and not catastrophic disasters, and that
military personnel could be trained accordingly. Id.
34 William C. Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September 11:
The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response, 64 LA. L. REV.
735, 771 (2004) (describing why military commanders might balk at the idea of police
training for soldiers); Cunningham, supra note 29, at 714.
35 See H.R. REP. No. 97-71, pt. 2, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1781, 1787 ("[N]o one has been charged or prosecuted under the Posse Comitatus Act
since its enactment.").
36 See, e.g., Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1961)
(denying a claim against the government because an Air Force pilot in violation of the
PCA was outside the scope of his employment at the time he injured a bystander).
37 DOD DIREcTIVE 5525.5, supra note 10, para. E4.3. Because restrictions on the
Navy and the Marines are more or less self-imposed, the Secretary of the Navy may
waive the restrictions on a "case-by-case basis." Id. Hammond, supra note 12, at 982-83,
calls for an end to this strange division between regulatory and statutory coverage. The
Coast Guard generally functions without the restrictions of the PCA and has broad law
enforcement roles. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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Thus, the PCA applies to any four of these branches. Absent constitutional or
statutory exceptions, active-duty forces may not "execute the laws," language
that courts have interpreted to bar military activities considered law
enforcement. However, this prohibition on law enforcement does not ban
military assistance in general. To determine what forms of military assistance
constitute execution of the law, courts developed three tests. The best-known
articulation of these tests comes from the Wounded Knee cases-three
related cases in which the government sought to refute defendants'
allegations that officers had not lawfully seized them.
In the first of the three cases, United States v. Jaramillo, defendants
occupied a Native American community as part of a liberation movement. 38
Members of the group eventually surrendered, but introduced evidence at
trial of Army assistance, namely, equipping and providing logistical support
to FBI agents and other law enforcement officials. 39 Additionally, Army
officials had instructed law enforcement officials on civil disorder tactics
after initially being dispatched to determine whether federal troops might be
necessary.4 0 The District Court ruled that equipment provisions by the Army
did not violate the PCA. 41 As for the logistical support and tactical advice,
the issue turned on whether their activities pervaded that of civilian
authorities.42 The Court, while not reaching the ultimate question, noted that
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude Army personnel had controlled the
operation in a manner that effectively pervaded the activities of law
enforcement officials, even though they merely advised the proper
authorities.4 3 For the court in Jaramillo, military presence that directly
influenced the decisions of law enforcement officials would have been a
violation of the PCA. 44
The next of the Wounded Knee cases presented essentially the same
question, yet in United States v. Red Feather the court used a more
permissive test to determine what activities rose to the level of law
38 United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1376 (D. Neb. 1974).
39 Id. at 1378-79. Because the prosecution had to prove that exercise of authority by
government officials was lawful, a violation of the PCA would have defeated the element
of lawfulness. Id. at 1376.
40 Id. at 1379-80.
41 Id. at 1379. The sharing of equipment did not violate the Act because nothing in
the statute or legislative history indicated Congress sought to stem such behavior; in fact,
there was evidence that Congress clearly supported equipment sharing, and the statute
said nothing to the contrary. Id.
42 Id.
4 3 Id. at 1381.
44 Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1380. But see United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp.
186, 194 (D.N.D. 1976) (criticizing this holding as too vague in application).
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enforcement.45 With regard to equipment sharing, both courts deemed such
assistance permissible.46 As for the advice given by military personnel, the
court in Red Feather took a different approach. While the court in Jaramillo
held that advice could rise to the level of enforcement, the Red Feather court
focused primarily on the distinction between passive support and direct
assistance. Direct assistance in this formulation requires things like actual
operation of equipment and involvement in the activities of law enforcement
officials.
Somewhat similar to Red Feather, in United States v. McArthur, the
court also held that the PCA only barred active or actual involvement in
enforcing domestic laws. 47 In the words of the court, the PCA prohibited the
military from exercising power that "was regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory in nature. 48 In this regard, only those activities commonly
associated with police force, like searches and seizure are likely to violate the
PCA.49
C. Constitutional and Statutory Exceptions
The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military from assuming an active
role in domestic law enforcement unless the exceptions specifically
mentioned in the Act apply. These exceptions remove the prohibition on
active and direct enforcement of the law "in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution," or by an "Act of Congress." 50
Today, the exceptions granted by these two sources allow the military to take
45 United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 920-23 (D.S.D 1975).
4 6 Id. at 923.
47 McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194. Both McArthur and Red Feather were appealed
and consolidated in United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976). The court in
Casper affirmed the holding and reasoning of both cases without parsing the language,
although it cited the McArthur court more heavily. Casper, 541 F.2d at 1275-76, 1278.
48 McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194. Moreover, this exercise of force must cause
"citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or
compulsions imposed by military authority." Id.
49 Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1390-91, 1392 (8th Cir. 1985) (refusing to
dismiss a claim that the government violated the PCA because plaintiffs stated a claim by
alleging members of the armed forces set up roadblocks and conducted patrols). Cf
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (transport of suspected
hijacker by Navy did not violate the PCA because Navy did not participate in the actual
arrest, search, or seizure). This line of interpretation has been criticized by commentators
as undermining the rule. See, e.g., Paul Jackson Rice, New Laws and Insights Encircle the
Posse Comitatus Act, 104 MIL. L. REv. 109, 116 (1994).
50 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
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part in a wide variety of direct and active law enforcement activities. 5' In
recent times, the military has been used to enforce civil rights, stop looting,
and restore law and order after riots and disasters.52 Currently, Congress is
considering a categorical exception to the PCA for the purpose of preventing
illegal immigration.53 Although the PCA remains almost unchanged from its
enactment in 1878, the various exceptions to the law raised the suspicions of
those concerned with consequent threats to civil liberties,54 but they also
provided opponents an opportunity to advocate for a legislative coup de
grdce55 Whatever the merits of both criticisms regarding the PCA, it is
important to note the exceptions to the statute in general, and in the event of
a disaster. This Note proposes that, in a disaster, these general exceptions
could be pieced together to provide military commanders the legal authority
51 25 U.S.C. § 180 (2000) (removal of persons illegally occupying Native American
lands); 16 U.S.C. § 593 (2000) (timber protection in Florida); 42 U.S.C. § 97 (2000)
(enforcement of quarantine and health laws); 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000) (removal of
unlawful enclosures from public lands); 18 U.S.C. § 351 (2000) (enforcement assistance
in crimes against members of Congress); 16 U.S.C. § 23 (2000) (protection for parks); 16
U.S.C. § 1861(a) (2000) (enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976); 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2000) (assistance without regard to the PCA in crimes
involving nuclear material); 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (2000) (implementing warrants to enforce
specified civil rights); 48 U.S.C. § 1591 (2000) (support for authorities in the Virgin
Islands and Guam); 18 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (enforcement of crimes against foreign
officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons); 50 U.S.C. § 220 (2000)
(support for certain customs laws).
52 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., Posse Comitatus: Tiny Law, Big Impact, NAT'L J., Nov.
12, 2005, at 3557.
53 See H.R. 4240, 109th Cong. § 5 (1st Sess. 2005).
In General-Section 1385 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after 'execute the laws' the following: 'other than at or near a border of the
United States in order to prevent aliens not permitted by law to enter the United
States, terrorists, and drug smugglers from entering the United States.'
Id. Unlike the other exceptions, which are found elsewhere in the Code, this
provision would substantively revise the language of the Posse Comitatus Act.
54 Harry Levins, Loopholes in Law Give Military Ability to Play Role in U.S., ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 2002, at B6; Eugene R. Fidell, Think Again Before
Relaxing Posse Act, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 2002, at A 15.
55 See John R. Brinkerhoff, The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security, J.
HOMELAND SECURITY, Feb. 2002, available at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/joumal/articles/brinkerhoffpossecomitatus.htm; Ann
Roosevelt, Experts Debate Possible Police Role For Military, NAVY NEWS & UNDERSEA
TECH., Feb. 4, 2002, at 3; Derek Reveron, Katrina's Call, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 20,
2005, http://www.nationalreview.comjcomment/reveron200510200822.asp.
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to act, including the authority to enforce the law,56 if the conditions called for
such action; that is, if a disaster made it necessary for the military to save life
and property.
1. Insurrection Act
The boldest and least circumspect exception to the PCA is the
Insurrection Act, under which the President may command any branch of the
armed forces to quell insurrections, uprisings, and civil disturbances
threatening the operation of state or federal laws, with or without the request
of state authorities.57 The Insurrection Act contains three main provisions for
military law enforcement, of which only § 331 requires a Governor's
56 Nonetheless, piecing together various exceptions is not optimal. See infra Parts
IV, V.
57 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 331-335 (2006). The statute provides, in relevant parts, that:
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States,
in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he
considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
Id. § 331.
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of
any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce
those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
Id. § 332.
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other
means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State,
any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it-
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States
within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege,
immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the
constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right,
privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or
impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have
denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
Id. § 333.
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invitation. Sections 331 and 332 provide for military use by the President to
safeguard the operation of federal law and functions, whereas § 333 works to
safeguard the operation of state as well as federal laws.58
Nothing in the Insurrection Act defines such terms as "insurrection" or
"domestic violence., 59 However, agency regulations promulgated by the
Department of Defense define civil disturbance as "group acts of violence
and disorders prejudicial to public law and order," although the term civil
disturbance is not found in the statute.6° Case law indicates that the statute
gives the President a great deal of discretionary power in determining
whether domestic unrest or violence warrants military intervention.6' The Act
also emphasizes that the exercise of this discretion rests in the duty of the
federal government to serve as a last resort.62 Otherwise, the regulations
reiterate that states generally protect life and property and maintain order.63
However, nothing in the regulations requires states to have actually
exhausted their resources before looking elsewhere. If emerging conditions
appear to surpass state and local capacity, federal assistance under the
Insurrection Act is appropriate.64
In any event, the actual relationship of federal and state power has been,
at least in recent memory, far less complicated than the statute, which raises
thorny questions about the balance between state power and the inherent
right of the President to uphold the rule of law under the Constitution. The
58 Id. More specifically, § 333 empowers the President to enforce the rights and
protections of citizens under the Constitution even against state resistance. Notably,
under § 333 the state is said to have denied its residents the equal protection of the law.
10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000). Thus, although the general welfare of the public is entrusted to
the states, and the statute lets states decide when they need federal support, if
constitutional rights and protections or federal laws and property are at stake, the
President may act without the governor's request. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (2005).
59 Strictly interpreted, insurrection would mean violence intended to "overthrow a
lawfully constituted regime." Pan Am. World Airways v. Aetna, 505 F.2d 989, 1005 (2d
Cir. 1974). But other courts note that the term may also mean an outbreak of civil
disturbance or defiance of laws. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731,
736 (1st Cir. 1954). In any case, the Insurrection Act also uses terms such as "domestic
violence" and "unlawful combinations," language geared more towards riots and civil
disorder than insurrection and rebellion, which focus more on threats to the legitimacy of
governments at the federal or state level.
60 32 C.F.R. § 215.3(a) (2005). Somewhat unhelpfully, the regulations define civil
disturbance as any domestic condition requiring federal intervention. Id.
61 See Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1402 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(discussing the decision-making of presidents invoking the Insurrection Act).
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Insurrection Act was invoked in 1989 after reports of mass looting in St.
Croix following Hurricane Hugo,65 and again in 1992 when riots broke out in
Los Angeles. 66 On both occasions, requests for law and order assistance
came from the respective local and state officials and preceded the
President's invocation of the Act.67 Only in response to state refusal to
enforce the civil rights of African-Americans has the President invoked the
Act without state invitation. 68 Thus, while a state request is not legally
necessary, 69 recent experience seems to suggest such a request would be
expected unless a President deems state authorities to be acting in bad faith.7°
2. Other Statutes
Aside from the Insurrection Act, federal statutes contain a host of
specifically targeted provisions for direct and active military participation in
the enforcement of domestic laws. 7' One that might be relevant in a
discussion of the PCA and disasters provides for broad military assistance to
civilian law enforcement.72 Although that statute generally restricts the
military from directly participating in searches, seizures, and arrests, it
permits extensive use of military equipment, advice, and personnel for law
enforcement purposes.73 The only provision allowing for active military law
enforcement deals with emergencies involving chemical or biological
weapons of mass destruction in which the military's participation is
"necessary for the immediate protection of human life, and civilian law
65 Jeffrey Schmalz, Troops Find Looting and Devastation on St. Croix, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1989, at A22.
66 Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Political Issues Snarled Plans for
Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al.
67 Id.
68 Id.; Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1401-02 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(describing use of the Insurrection Act to enforce civil rights by Presidents Grant and
Kennedy); see also Nicholas Lemann, Insurrection, NEW YORKER, Sept. 26, 2005, at 67
(pointing out the racial component of past invocations of the Insurrection Act). This
legacy of states acting in bad faith remains tied to the Insurrection Act, a factor discussed
below in Part IV.C.
69 See Bergman, 565 F. Supp. at 1402 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (noting the Insurrection
Act can be invoked without state consent or invitation).
70 Lipton et al., supra note 66 (describing how these worries influenced the
decisions of executive branch officials after Hurricane Katrina).
71 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
72 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382 (2000) (providing for military assistance to civilian law
enforcement in activities such as drug interdictions and terrorism).
73 Id. § 374.
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enforcement officials are not capable of taking the action., 74 While this
statutory scheme codifies the Wounded Knee cases by allowing for extensive
passive or non-coercive support to law enforcement officials,7 5 it reinforces
the notion that the PCA is more concerned with military involvement in
routine police activities, in which states presumably possess the capacity to
enforce the law. When an emergency would reasonably be expected to
overwhelm or succeed in overwhelming the resources of any given state, the
policy concerns underlying the PCA hold less force. This logic runs
throughout the other types of exceptions below.
3. Constitutional Exceptions
The PCA does not apply "in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution. ',76 Interpreting this particular clause often
leads commentators to invoke legislative history rather than its plain
language because of problematic constitutional questions raised by the
express-grant clause. 77 Historically, the clause was most likely a face-saving
compromise to appease legislators who believed the Constitution expressly
granted the President the power to use the military to execute domestic
laws. 78 For legislators who saw no such express grant, the clause added
nothing to the statute. 79 The Constitution states that the President, as the
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. 's It also guarantees states the protection of the federal
7 4 Id. § 382(d)(2)(B)(i).
75 See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
76 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2005).
77 See Doyle, supra note 21, at 34-36. There are two issues contained in the
constitutional question: first, whether the Constitution expressly grants the executive
branch power to enforce the law with military forces; second, if the Constitution contains
no express grant, to what extent may Congress restrict any implied power said to exist.
Id.; Compare Note, Honored in the Breach: Presidential Authority to Execute the Laws
with Military Force, 83 YALE L.J. 130, 143-44 (1973) (no express grant and no power to
utilize military law enforcement without congressional authority), with H.W. Furhman,
Restrictions upon Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MIL. L. REV.
85, 91-92 (1960) (no express grant necessary for the exercise of President's implied
power to resort to military law enforcement). No court has addressed the specific
question of whether the constitutional exception includes the President's inherent powers.
Doyle, supra note 21, at 37.
78 Doyle, supra note 21, at 34.
79 James P. O'Shaughnessy, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics
Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 712 (1976).
80 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 cl. 3.
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government against domestic violence. 8' What exactly this means for the
PCA is not clear, but given the "odd compromise" responsible for the clause,
the qualification that constitutional authority must be express should
probably not be read literally.82
Department of Defense regulations, which usually take the middle road
on the authorization of domestic military force, speak of the inherent
authority found in the Constitution, instead of express authority, to safeguard
the public order and to keep the government functioning.83 The DOD reads
this to confer two specific exceptions to the PCA. The first is emergency
authority.84 Emergency authority contemplates the use of the military to
prevent the loss of life and property in sudden disasters and civil disturbances
that surpass the capability of state and local authorities.85 The other exception
is for the protection of federal property and functions.86 Unlike the
emergency exception, the exception to protect federal property and functions
need not involve a calamitous event but rather a threat to property and
functions that are primarily federal.87 Of these two types of federal
exceptions, the protection of federal functions is more malleable, as federal
functions have been defined by the Code to include the mail system and
goods involved in interstate commerce.88 The exceptions promulgated by the
DOD mirror the statutory exceptions in their insistence that states be unable
or unwilling to discharge their functions before permitting military
intervention.89
4. Immediate Response Authority
There is yet another emergency exception-immediate response
authority-that is said to exist although the historical and legal arguments for
it are scant. 90 It is not found in statutes or in the Constitution because its
distinguishing feature lies in the discretionary power temporarily placed in
the hands of military commanders. That is, unlike the emergency authority
81 Id. art. IV, § 4.
82 Doyle, supra note 21, at 34 n.40.
83 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1) (2005).
84 Id. § 215.4(c)(1)(i).
85 Id.
86 Id. § 215.4(c)(1)(ii).
87 Id.
88 See id. § 215.3(b), (d).
89 See 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2005).
90 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3025.1, MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL
AUTHORrTIES para. 4.5 (1997) [hereinafter DOD DIRECrIVE 3025.1].
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issued by the President, the decision to utilize military forces to prevent "life
or wanton destruction of property" out of necessity falls on military
commanders or DOD officials. 91 DOD directives place military law
enforcement outside the scope of immediate response power, which
primarily deals with disaster relief. However, in civil disturbances where
military law enforcement is imminently necessary, the DOD directives
permit the appropriate military commanders and DOD officials to take action
while simultaneously seeking presidential authorization.
92
Immediate response authority was relied upon to respond to the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, although the military refrained from
directly participating in law enforcement activities. 93 One notable example
that included active military law enforcement was the 1906 San Francisco
fire, where federally armed forces were used to stop looting as well as fight
fires and protect federal property.94 Outside of these, there is little mention of
this power in practice.
As an exception to the PCA, the power of immediate response authority
seems insignificant due to the availability of state forces, and to the relative
speed with which commanders can communicate any emergencies requiring
such force.95 This relative insignificance is desirable because even periodic
reliance on such an exception raises serious concerns about the power of the
military over civilian affairs. However, as an exception based purely on the
practical need to prevent loss of life and property in situations where extreme
exigencies make it necessary, the immediate response exception gets at a
common principle underlying the broadly phrased exceptions to the
prohibition on active and direct military law enforcement. That principle, as
pointed out by several observers, is best expressed by the notion of
necessity.96 Based on these exceptions, Congress, the President, and
Governors have access to essential military law enforcement.
91 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3025.12, MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL
DISTURBANCES para. 4.2.2.1 (1994).
92 Id. at para. 4.2.2.
93 Jim Winthorp, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and
Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), 1997 ARMY LAW. 3, 15.
94 Id. at 5.
95 Id. at 7 n.39; 32 C.F.R. § 501.2(a) (2006).
96 Winthrop, supra note 93, at 4; JENNIFER K. ELSEA, THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS
FOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE: LEGAL ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 2
(2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf; Felicetti & Luce,
supra note 31, at 128.
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III. DISASTER RELIEF AND MILITARY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Thus far, the discussion of domestic military use has assumed that the
question of whether to use military personnel turns solely on whether there is
an exception to the PCA allowing direct law enforcement. Now the focus
shifts slightly to a form of direct military participation that does not depend
on an exception to the PCA--disaster relief. Disaster relief is by far the most
visible domestic function of the military. When the military conducts disaster
relief, it does so under the Stafford Act.97 Because the Stafford Act does not
expressly provide for military law enforcement, any law enforcement activity
during a disaster must seek alternative legal grounds. As argued in Part IV.A,
there are alternative grounds available-at least in theory, if the chief federal
and state executives believe it necessary to use troops.98 Nonetheless, the
application of the PCA and its exceptions in disaster relief efforts is ripe for
confusion. However, before discussing some of the problems of the PCA
during disaster relief, it will be helpful to briefly consider the Stafford Act,
the statute that authorizes the relief, and two critical components of disaster
relief law, the National Guard and the federalism underlying the Stafford
Act.
A. Disaster Relief Law: The Stafford Act
The Stafford Act is the primary disaster relief statute authorizing the
President to deploy the military for disaster relief upon the request of a state
governor.99 Under the Stafford Act, the military assists and supplements the
work of local and state officials in times of disaster and emergencies.
Although sometimes used interchangeably, disasters and emergencies are
distinguished in the statute and may trigger different types of assistance.
Declarations of major disasters and emergencies must be initiated by a
governor unless a President decides that an emergency implicates interests
for which the "United States exercises exclusive or preeminent
responsibility," in which case the President may declare an emergency but
not a major disaster.' °° Major disasters are defined as natural catastrophes, or
any catastrophes that result in a fire, flood, or explosion.' 0' Emergency
97 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2005).
98 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
99 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170 (declaring major disaster), 5191 (declaring emergency).
10 Id. § 5191(b).
101 44 C.F.R. § 206.2(17) (2006).
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indicates any event necessitating federal intervention to save lives, protect
property and the public health, or to avert a catastrophe.1
0 2
No difference between the two exists with respect to the use of federal
troops, whose essential assistance the Stafford Act limits to ten days. 
3
Pursuant to the Act, the military may be called to perform a range of tasks.
There are provisions for road clearing, debris removal, search and rescue
missions, logistical advice, food and medical supplies, and for shelter.
°n
However, the Act does not enable the military to restore law and order by
arrests and seizures, nor by any other direct law enforcement methods unless
those actions happen to consist of a military purpose like guarding military
bases.10 5 While deployed the troops remain under the normal chain of
command, with the President as the Commander in Chief, although the
regulations obviously insist on the coordination of state and local
responders. 106
For both declarations, state resources must be found inadequate to deal
with or avert the threat posed by the catastrophe. Consequently, governors
must describe and execute the state emergency plan in order to assess the
shortcomings for which federal assistance is necessary.
°7
Troops deployed under the Stafford Act provide logistical and
humanitarian relief, but questions of policing disaster stricken areas are never
102 Id. Aside from procedural and definitional distinctions, emergencies and
disasters trigger different types of assistance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170a, 5192.
103 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c).
'(4 Id. §§ 5170b(a)(3), 5192(a)(3).
105 DOD DIRECrIVE 5525.5 para. E2.1.4 (1986). The military purpose doctrine is not
an exception to the PCA because actions undertaken for a valid military purpose fall
outside the scope of the purpose of the PCA to prohibit military enforcement of civilian
laws. People v. Burden, 303 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Mich. 1981); Clarence I. Meeks III,
Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, 70 MIL. L. REV. 83, 124 (1975). Any benefits provided to civilian law enforcement
pursuant to a military purpose are said to be incidental to the primary purpose. Id. at 124-
26. That said, the obvious question for the courts, which generally arises when military
actions provide law enforcement benefits, is what constitutes a valid military purpose?
The answer given by courts escapes consistency. See Doyle, supra note 21, at 49-51.
Stricter courts demand a close nexus between the stated purpose and the law enforcement
activity, while others settle for a mere relation between the two. Id. Notably, these cases
arise in activities like undercover drug operations and routine criminal investigations. The
working of this exception in the context of a large-scale disaster relief effort is not
covered by the cases.
106 44 C.F.R. § 206.3 (2005).
107 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191(a) (2000).
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too far off or entirely avoidable. 10 8 Because their humanitarian role forces
them into direct contact with civilians, the military's presence walks a fine
line between maintaining order and providing relief.1°9 Normally, no such
line exists for the National Guard, which significantly eases the military
burden in terms of disaster response, especially in the Guard's ability to
provide security. Yet, despite the PCA's general inapplicability to the Guard,
the PCA plays a large and perhaps unhelpful role in the utilization of the
Guard.
B. The National Guard
Notwithstanding the important role of the military, the bulk of disaster
relief work generally falls to the National Guard." 0 These units wear the
same uniform as Army or Air Force personnel"' but generally operate
without the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. 1 2 The PCA applies to
108 See Thomas R. Lujan, Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army, 27
PARAMETERS 82 (1997), available at http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm.
109 Id.
110 See Mark Sappenfield, Katrina Poses Key Test for Stretched National Guard,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 2, 2005, at 2 (reporting on the traditional role of the
National Guard and its role in Hurricane Katrina). The author also briefly describes the
tension between this traditional role and its increasing involvement in foreign missions
and wars. Id. For an article discussing this tension and its impact on retaining Guard
members and reserves, see Cunningham, supra note 29, at 712-13.
111 Laurent Belsie, US Forces Bring Hurricane Relief in Big Amounts, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1992, at 1 (mentioning the identical uniforms of both forces in the
response efforts after Hurricane Hugo); Rudy Abramson, U.S. Again Looks to Reservists,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1990, at Al. During hearings on the government response to
Hurricane Katrina, Senator John Warner, a strong advocate of reexamining the Posse
Comitatus Act, used the fact of identical uniforms to remark that civilians could not tell
who was enforcing the law, suggesting that it might not make a practical difference in
terms of civilian impressions. Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of The Department of
Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency Leadership, Panel I of
a Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. John Warner, Chairman, Comm. on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs).
112 Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The Act does not
apply to members of the National Guard unless they have been called into 'federal
service.' Until called into such service, members of the National Guard remain state,
rather than federal officers."); United States v. Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding the same); United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding the same and stating that Congress intended to give the National Guard broad
power to enforce state laws).
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the National Guard only if federalized, 1 3 thereby bringing the Guard under
the military's command and control." 14 In most disasters, the Guard serves as
a state militia unrestricted by the statutes and regulations against military law
enforcement. For this and other reasons, like their geographical proximity to
and knowledge of the affected areas, Guard units are especially useful in
disaster relief efforts, often taking the lead role on the ground.
The dual status of the National Guard is a special feature that also
presents some unique problems. Because Guard units are generally
considered the first line of defense in disasters, their ability to maintain law
and order as well as provide relief is invaluable to states., 15 If a major
disaster or emergency declaration requires the use of military personnel, that
state's Guard units are also attractive as federal troops for logistical,
administrative, and policy reasons.'
16
Federalizing such units, however, means bringing them within the scope
of the PCA, and where maintaining law and order is an issue, Governors hate
to give up this component of the state's disaster response. 1 7 By its
113 Gilbert, 165 F.3d at 473.
114 Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990). In Perpich, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to enact a statute providing for the
federalizing of state Guards without the consent of the State Governor, even during times
of peace, for training abroad. Id. at 335.
115 See, e.g., Paul Purpura, Bush Orders 7,200 Troops to Join N. 0. Area Effort,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Sept. 4, 2005 (describing the presence of the National
Guard during Hurricane Katrina); Belsie, supra note 111, at 1. The fallout from the
Guard's failure or inability to provide relief and maintain order in New Orleans
immediately after Hurricane Katrina underscores its importance as a first responder.
Editorial, Unprepared, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A30.
116 Lipton et al., supra note 66. Besides faster deployment, the military may want a
uniform command structure over Guard and active-duty forces, which also gives the
executive branch better control of the costs of disaster relief. See generally Why Deploy
Guard to Airports?, ORLANDO SENTINEL (FLORIDA), Sept. 28, 2001, at A9 (discussing
costs); Katherine Mclntire Peters, Defending U.S., Gov'T EXECUTIVE, June 2000, at 37-
38 (discussing control and command). See News: Live Update from Los Angeles-
Firemen Exhausted (CNN television broadcast May 1, 1992), for an illustration of an
emergency that led to federalizing state Guard units.
117 See, e.g., Live From: Rescuers Encounter Victims Who Want to Stay in New
Orleans. President and Laura Bush Visit Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge
(CNN television broadcast Sept. 5, 2005). In that broadcast, the reporter from Louisiana
had this to say:
Now, one of the reasons that there was a falling out between the president and
the governor is that the White House really wanted to federalize the National Guard.
That would have meant that they would have been under the military's command.
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prohibition on military law enforcement, the PCA certainly complicates
federal and state conflicts over control of the Guard. Traditionally, these
conflicts arose in the context of foreign missions, or orders to train outside of
the state. 118 Therefore, analysis of the conflict has tried to balance state
demands and needs with national prerogatives.' 19 According to the United
States Supreme Court, a Governor may not prohibit federalization unless
facing an emergency that requires the Guard units in question. 120 Apparently,
this power to reject the federalization of state troops includes times when
federalization serves the purpose of disaster relief for the home state. 12 As
happened in Hurricane Katrina, the tradeoff, unlike the traditional national-
versus-local conflict, is between two similar "local" interests. Federal
officials might prefer a unified command structure for efficient and effective
disaster relief while state executives want the Guard to retain the ability to
maintain order and provide security. 12 2 Because the decision of whether to
federalize troops is complicated enough for state and federal executives, the
The governor did not want that. She wanted to be able to use them as more of a
law enforcement arm to try to restore order, especially in the streets of New Orleans,
where there were reports that gangs were riding around on the backs of trucks with
AK-47s and rifles, that they were shooting at police officers. She wanted to make
sure that she had control over them in order to help restore order.
The White House, on the other hand, felt that it was necessary for them to be in
charge of the National Guard in order to consolidate and coordinate the command of
security. So that was their focus.
Id.
118 See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 336 (dealing with whether Guard units could be ordered
to train abroad in peacetime without a State Governor's consent).
119 Id. at 340-43 (analyzing the conflict in terms of local versus national interest);
Patrick Todd Mullins, Note, The Militia Clauses, the National Guard, and Federalism: A
Constitutional Tug of War, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 328, 340-46 (1988) (discussing the
historical and legislative tensions in the use of the National Guard for state and national
missions). This balancing of interests fails to explain the dilemma where both federal and
state officials seek Guard members to respond to the same disaster; both are calling the
Guard for a substantially similar or non-conflicting purpose.
120 Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1990). In ruling that the
President may send Guard members abroad to train without a Governor's consent, the
Court noted that federalization could still be refused if Guard members were needed for
state emergencies or disasters. Id.
121 Jim VandeHei, Officials Deal with Political Fallout by Pointing Fingers, WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A17.
122 See supra note 115. For a brief but interesting discussion of centralizing disaster
response from a law and economics perspective, visit Posting of Richard Posner to The
Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/10/federalismecon.htmil#c070302 (Oct. 9, 2005, 07:30 CST).
Political motives may also be a factor, but there is little proof that this affects the decision
to request and approve assistance.
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PCA creates a rather artificial distinction between the same units. One
solution would be to exempt federalized Guards but this would mean having
two different laws apply to military personnel under the same command.' 23 A
more comprehensive solution would be to clarify the operation of the PCA in
a disaster.124
The .tension found throughout such conflicts has naturally led to
questions about the larger place of federalism in disaster relief. As argued
below, proponents of strengthening the hand of the President misunderstand
the nature of the federalism in the Stafford Act.
123 See, e.g., Martin Matishak, Pentagon Asks Lawmakers for Greater Authority
over Guard, Reserve, HOMELAND DEFENSE WATCH, Apr. 24, 2006 (telling of Pentagon's
request that dual-capacity Guard officers remain exempt from the PCA at all times). The
issue of who should ultimately control the National Guard in a disaster is beyond the
scope of this Note. On that topic see the traditional debate in John G. Kester, State
Governors and the Federal National Guard, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 181
(1988), which suggests that ultimate control rests with the federal government. But the
question over the Guard should not be confused with the question of who should trigger
the provisions of the Stafford Act, which is addressed in Part III.C.
124 See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
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C. Federalism and Disaster Relief
The Stafford Act shares an important feature with many laws governing
military assistance. 125 The provisions for military use under the Stafford Act
are state-triggered. This relationship between federal and state authorities has
come under review by key executive officials.1 26 Thus, the issue of
federalism underscores the debate about the legality and desirability of
military support in response to a disaster.
Disaster relief and response falls largely under the purview of
governors. 27 Federal law governing disaster response efforts requires state
governments to assess the damage or potential damage and to determine the
nature of the federal response required to supplement state resources. 28
Weakening or circumventing the federalism inherit in disaster response laws
would probably not result in significant benefits, but it most likely would
confuse or cause unnecessary conflicts between state and federal actors. The
requirement that a state governor request federal assets and personnel in
response to an overwhelming disaster serves an important function but does
not significantly hamper the ability of the military to prepare and respond if
needed. The state-trigger provisions are important in practice mostly because
of what they require states to do, 129 not because of what they prohibit the
federal government from doing.
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000) (mandating that federal intervention warranted for
natural disasters beyond state capabilities); id. § 5191(a) (mandating that federal
intervention in emergencies "shall be based on a finding that the situation ... is beyond
the capabilities" of state and local governments); 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (authorizing
federal intervention to protect state functions upon a state's request); id. § 333 (providing
for military suppression of domestic violence and enforcement of civil rights if states are
unable, fail, or refuse to do so); 32 C.F.R § 501.1(a) (2006) (acknowledging states as
having primary responsibility for protection of life and property, and authorizing military
law enforcement where states "have utilized all of their own forces and are unable to
control the situation, or when the situation is beyond the capabilities of State or local civil
authorities, or when State and local civil authorities will not take appropriate action"); id.
§ 215.4 (2004) (reiterating the same for the deployment of troops in civil disturbances).
126 Robert Burns, U.S. Looks at Role for Military; Some Want to Change Law to
Permit Using Soldiers in Disasters, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at 15A.
127 See supra Part III.A.
128 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
129 Under the Stafford Act, state governors determine "that effective response is
beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal
assistance is necessary." 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191(a) (2004). A request based on such a
determination must be accompanied by the execution of the state's emergency plans and
information with regard to the state resources employed or to be employed in disaster
relief. Id. Pursuant to regulations implementing the Act, a Governor must also identify
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In any given year, the President declares over fifty emergencies and
major disasters upon the request of state governors, 130 which range from
snowstorms affecting a few counties to hurricanes that devastate coastlines
across state boundaries. Requests reviewed by FEMA for approval preceded
each of these declarations.' 3 In that sense, the Stafford Act's provisions for
state requests function like an application for federal assistance rather than a
wall of gubernatorial authority. 32 Additionally, the information provided by
states and the execution of state emergency plans serve a valuable role to the
federal government. For example, such requests identify affected areas by
name and list the state resources deployed in the response, which saves
federal agencies time and avoids redundancy.
Although no lawmaker has suggested the wholesale abandonment of this
process, several have wondered publicly whether the Department of Defense
should lead response efforts in disasters like Hurricane Katrina. 33
Presumably, enabling federal responders to act without a governor's
invitation would remove a significant burden from the military, but this
the areas affected or likely to be affected because of the disaster, and "the type and extent
of federal aid required." Id. For a recent example of such a request, see Letter from
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor, State of Louisiana, to George W. Bush,
President, United State of America (Aug. 28, 2005), available at
http://69.2.43.89/Disaster%2ORelief%20Request.pdf.
130 An Interview with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, JOINT
FORCE Q., Jan. 1, 2006, at 10, 14 [hereinafter Assistant Secretary Interview].
131 Id. at 14-15.
132 As such, the scope of FEMA's discretionary power has been subject to litigation.
As an agency, FEMA's actions are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). Kansas ex rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Kan. 1990)
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2004)). However, the APA shields the discretionary
functions of an agency from judicial review. Id. In Kansas ex rel. Hayden, the court
refused to review the denial by the President of a Governor's "major disaster" request,
although it agreed to hear the issue of whether FEMA's acting director had unilaterally
denied the Governor. Id. at 803-04. FEMA may not unilaterally deny a Governor's
emergency or major disaster request under the Stafford Act, id. at 801, but the agency's
administration of disaster relief is generally not up for review. City of San Bruno v.
FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (granting summary judgment for
lack of jurisdiction over FEMA's resource allocation); see also Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) (defining the concept of discretion). But see United
Power Ass'n v. FEMA, No. A2-99-180, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12922, at *3-4 (D.N.D.
Aug. 14, 2001) (finding that the Stafford Act precludes review of discretionary functions,
not constitutional claims).
133 Letter from Sen. John Warner, Chairman, Armed Forces Comm., to Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 14, 2005) (on file with author) (urging greater role
for the military in large-scale disasters); Assistant Secretary Interview, supra note 130, at
14-15; Jim VandeHei & Josh White, Bush Urges Shift in Relief Responsibilities, WASH.
POST, Sept. 26, 2005, at A12.
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presumption should not be given too much weight for several reasons. The
first reason is that while this change in leadership would not be merely
superficial because it would greatly enlarge the DOD's domestic role, 34 it is
not a necessary vehicle for upgrading military preparation and readiness.
According to testimony from military leaders, the state request requirement
was not itself a significant burden on preparedness and capacity to respond
during Hurricane Katrina. 35 Federalism does not preclude preparation or
better coordination of military resources among federal agencies nor with
states.' 36 To the extent the DOD anticipates the necessity of large-scale
military commitment in future scenarios, it may prepare and build capacity as
if it will be called.'
37
While uncertain to produce significant improvements in the military's
operational capacity, 38 designating the DOD as lead agency would certainly
134 See infra note 161 for a cursory description of DOD's current role. While a
discussion of the relationship between the various federal-state agencies and the DOD
goes beyond the scope of this Note, the DOD's current role consists of supporting other
federal agencies called lead agencies, like FEMA, that exist primarily to assist local and
state authorities. See Brian Kamoie, The National Response Plan: A New Framework for
Homeland Security, Public Health, and Bioterrorism Response, 38 J. HEALTH L. 287,
290-300 (2005), for an overview of the current system. For relevant parts of the actual
plan, see DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 15-45, 91-
94(2004).
135 Although military personnel did not receive orders to deploy until three days
after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, nothing prevented the military from anticipating a
request to provide assistance. See Hurricane Katrina and the Defense Department
Response, Panel I of a Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Katrina Hearing] (statement of Paul
McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense).
136 See Ernest B. Abbott, Homeland Security in the 21st Century: New Inroads on
the State Police Power, 36 URB. LAW. 837, 838-41 (2004) (noting the considerable
flexibility of the federal government in disaster response within the bounds of
federalism); William C. Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September
11: The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response, 64 LA. L.
REV. 735, 774-75 (2004) (stressing the need for better utilization of existing powers).
13 7 See STEVE BOwMAN ET AL., HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD DISASTER RESPONSE,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 13 (2005), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf (acknowledging the military's ability to
anticipate disaster response missions).
138 Improving and clarifying the relationship between the federal agencies, instead
of creating another lead agency, seems more urgent. See id. (counseling Congress to
review the Department of Homeland Security's internal procedures that create
unnecessary delay after requests for assistance); Katrina Hearing, supra note 135
(statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Ranking Member, Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Comm.) (identifying confusion and sluggishness between the
agencies in the failure to execute the National Response Plan after Hurricane Katrina);
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raise questions about how to determine when the DOD should take the lead.
Obviously, the DOD would not take charge during every snowstorm and
flood. The question then is how disastrous must a disaster be before the DOD
takes over the role of state and local authorities. Stating that the DOD would
become lead agency only when a disaster overwhelms state or local resources
merely begs the question currently answered by initially giving state officials
the task of determining when their responders and resources are or would be
overwhelmed.
Asking states to determine when a disaster or emergency overwhelms
their resources is sensible as state authorities know the resources available to
them and are therefore likely to have a better picture of what state responders
can handle. 39 If states would continue this role with the creation of another
lead agency, the question of how to determine when to take the lead would
be answered; however, that system would look similar to the one in place
today. 140 The major difference would be that after a state requests federal
assistance, the DOD would displace another federal agency in leading the
disaster response.' 41 On the other hand, if the DOD, in addition to being a
lead agency, also initially determines if a looming disaster warrants
intervention, the decision-making process becomes needlessly convoluted.
Rather than strengthening the hand of the President by weakening the
inherent federalism, proponents of more effective disaster relief should seek
clarity in the law governing the military response.
IV. MILITARY NEED FOR CLARITY, NOT POWER
The statutory and regulatory framework that governs military law
enforcement portrays the PCA as primarily concerned with limiting direct
military participation in traditional police functions like arrests and seizures
Banks, supra note 136, at 741-44, 750-57, 770-76 (examining the various agencies
involved in disasters and emergencies and discussing the questions raised by their
proliferation).
139 This is important because one goal of the Stafford Act is to encourage states to
monitor and develop their disaster response systems. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(2) (2000)
("encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and assistance
plans, programs, capabilities, and organizations by the States and by local governments");
see also 44 C.F.R. § 201.1(b) (2005) ("The purpose of mitigation planning is for State...
governments to identify the natural hazards that impact them, to identify actions and
activities to reduce any losses from those hazards, and to establish a coordinated process
to implement the plan, taking advantage of a wide range of resources.").
140 See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
141 See infra note 161. This bifurcation of lead agencies under the Stafford Act
would further require the determination of when the DOD would displace DHS's FEMA
branch.
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where local and state authorities possess law enforcement capacity. 142 Even
critics who generally believe the spirit and letter of the PCA warrants a
broader application 143 concede that concerns with military policing decrease
where state authorities are unable to discharge their police power. This
situation commonly arises amidst major disasters and emergencies.144
Such commentators are willing to ease the restriction on military policing
because of two limiting factors.1 45 First, military involvement must be
necessary for the preservation of life and property. Second, the policing is
limited in scope and duration by the disaster or emergency necessitating a
military response. These two factors are fundamental to current exceptions,
and are dealt with more concretely in the following section. Section B
follows with some of the problems in applying the PCA during disaster
response, while Section C discusses problems with the Insurrection Act in
the context of disaster relief.
A. The Power to Use the Military when Necessary
Given the structure of the PCA, which prohibits military law
enforcement not provided for by the Constitution or by statute, application of
exceptions to the PCA is just as significant as the rule itself. That is, the
broad language of the exceptions to the PCA gives the various officials
involved in the decision-making process a great deal of discretion. 146 In a
disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina, state and federal officials have
enough leeway to deploy military personnel to restore order if the need
should arise. The first, and most obvious, manner in which this can happen is
by a request from the governor of the affected state declaring the need for
military law enforcement under the Insurrection Act, as was the case in St.
14 2 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382 (2000). Sections 371-382 are notable because they
establish the outer limits of permissible military support in the prosecution of routine
criminal activity. See id. While a number of commentators criticize the high level of
military intervention authorized, most of the criticism is directed against military
involvement in routine peacekeeping activities, and in localized events. See, e.g., David
B. Kopel and Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster
and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REv. 619, 619, 624-
38 (1997) (criticizing the war on drugs and the role of the federal government in Waco).
143 See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
144 See Hammond, supra note 12, at 983.
14 5 Id.
14 6 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1972) (holding that the use of the military
under the Insurrection Act depends on the discretionary power of state and federal
executives); Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1401-03 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(discussing the discretionary power of the President under the Insurrection Act).
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Croix after Hurricane Hugo. 47 Such an exception was invoked even in the
context of a non-disaster, where local and state officials had largely restored
order by the time military soldiers arrived.
148
Absent a request from the state executive or legislature, the President
may rely on the Insurrection Act, or on the powers said to inhere in the
Constitution, to authorize military law enforcement. Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy enforced federal desegregation laws without a state request.149
Although this was due to the unwillingness of those states to carry out federal
laws, nothing in the statute requires resistance. The mere inability to enforce
protections or rights under the Constitution or federal law suffices. While the
limits of this power have not been tested, 50 looting and violence in the
context of a disaster appears to fall within the ambit of the Insurrection
Act. 15' Even without explicit statutory authority, DOD regulations provide
enough cover for a President to act in the above situation. 5 2 These
regulations identify a constitutional exception to the PCA in emergencies
where states are unable to prevent the loss of life and property.'53 With
regard to both statutory and constitutional powers, the real question is one of
necessity. In the ordinary course of events, state or local forces may be
reasonably expected to handle the contingency, and direct and active military
law enforcement will not be necessary.
As for the constitutionally-based duty to protect federal property and
functions, the authority flowing from it appears more circumscribed, at least
with regard to federal property. 54 However, some authors suggest that the
federal functions clause might be read quite broadly in light of the growth of
147 Schmalz, supra note 65; see also Exec. Order No. 12,690, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,153
(Sept. 20, 1989) (ordering troops to the Virgin Islands to restore law and order under the
Insurrection Act).
148 CURRtER, supra note 11, at 12; see also Exec. Order No. 12,804, 57 Fed. Reg.
19,361 (May 1, 1992).
149 See Bergman, 565 F. Supp. at 1402.
150 Doyle, supra note 21, at 37.
151 Because the Insurrection Act gives the President a great deal of discretion, it is
not clear at what point civil unrest becomes subject to military coercion. However, in a
disaster where state and local authorities have been overwhelmed or incapacitated, even
lower levels of unrest might support invocation of the Act. Cf 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1)(i)
(2005) (authorizing military law enforcement when "disasters, or calamities seriously
endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent
that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situations").
152 Id. §§ 215.1-215.5.
153 Id. § 215.4(c)(1)(i) (emergency authority of the federal government).
154 See id. § 215.3(b) ("property ... owned, leased, possessed, or occupied by the
Federal Government").
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federal functions in modem times.1 55 The regulatory language allowing the
federal government the ability to protect, by force if necessary, "any
function... carried out under the laws of the United States 156 does indeed
leave a lot of room for creative interpretations. This opportunity has not gone
unnoticed by executive branch officials. 57
B. The Need for Clarification
Because of the statutory and constitutional exceptions to the PCA, critics
of giving the military greater roles in disasters like Hurricane Katrina argue
that the PCA poses no great obstacle to the use of military equipment and
personnel in such circumstances.1 58 Undoubtedly, where there is political
will, the law supports the use of the military for everything from debris
removal to stopping looters. Given the significant number of exceptions to
the PCA and the unlikely chance of successful prosecution of its violators,
the PCA functions more like a policy than a criminal law. 159 While military
commanders and guidelines continue to observe this policy in conducting
civilian missions, the law governing armed forces could use clarification.
For example, after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida, President Clinton
deployed a Joint Task Force under the Stafford Act.' 60 Because the Stafford
Act contains no exceptions to the PCA's proscriptions, the military's mission
was to support FEMA's relief work,161 which does not include law
155 CRAIG T. TREBILCOCK, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, POSSE
COMITATUS-HAS THE POSSE OUTLIVED ITS PURPOSE? 4 (2000),
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/trebilcock.pdf; Yoo, supra note 6. Cf Hammond,
supra note 12, at 968-69 (recognizing the ambiguity of the notion but doubting whether
courts would uphold the expansive power).
156 32 C.F.R. § 215.3(d) (2005).
157 Lipton et al., supra note 66, at A22 (reporting Attorney General Gonzalez's
advice to DOJ lawyers to creatively interpret federal laws like anti-carjacking statutes to
assist local authorities).
158 Yoo, supra note 6.
159 Felicetti & Luce, supra note 31, at 163; Hammond, supra note 12, at 960.
Hammond sensibly seeks to reconstitute the PCA under Title 10, which governs the
military, from its current home under Title 18, which deals with "Crimes and Criminal
Procedure." Id. at 981.
160 John J. Copelan, Jr. & Steven A. Lamb, Disaster Law and Hurricane Andrew-
Government Lawyers Leading the Way to Recovery, 27 URB. LAW. 29, 33-35 (1995).
161 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for "all
functions and authorities prescribed" by the Stafford Act. 6 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (Supp.
2003). FEMA became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002. Id.
§§ 311-317. A report prepared for Congress explains the relationship as follows:
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enforcement. From case law, it is well settled that troops could not arrest,
detain, or search individuals, or operate roadblocks. 62 While the difference
between arresting suspects and distributing food and water may be clear,
some distinctions between passive assistance to law enforcement and active
participation are not immediately apparent. 163 For instance, according to case
law and military regulations interpreting the PCA, the Task Force ordered to
Florida could not perform traffic control, an activity not immediately evident
as prohibited by the PCA.
However, military personnel may control traffic on routes with military
convoys because of the military purpose doctrine.164 The practical operation
of the PCA and the military purpose doctrine is not always clear in these
situations. It is even less clear when military property and personnel are in
close proximity to civilians and disaster victims. Because of the military
purpose doctrine, the PCA does not prohibit the military from securing
military property and military sites. 165 But it is not uncommon for military
sites to be in close proximity or coextensive with shelters or relief centers. 166
In these situations, it is not clear whether the soldiers may secure the
facilities because of the uncertain operation of the PCA and the military
purpose doctrine during disaster relief. Military leaders faced this situation
after Hurricane Andrew and opted to refrain from securing the facilities after
In keeping with the National Response Plan (NRP) and the DOD Joint Doctrine
on Homeland Security, DOD civil support is normally provided only when local,
state, and other federal resources are "overwhelmed"; and it is requested by the Lead
Federal Agency responding to an incident or natural disaster.
With the exception of [certain] circumstances ... unless there is a specific
direction from the President, requests for military assistance [typically] must
originate from ... Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department
of Homeland Security. Requests are submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, where they are evaluated by the ASD(HD) [Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Homeland Defense] according to the following criteria: legality, readiness, lethality,
risk, cost, and appropriateness.
BOwMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 1-3.
162 See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
163 Lujan, supra note 108, at 83-84; see also Copelan & Lamb, supra note 160, at
38 (warning about the use of troops for traffic control).
164 Copelan & Lamb, supra note 160, at 38; Meeks, supra note 105, at 125; see
generally supra note 105 (citing to sources that discuss the military purpose doctrine).
165 ELSEA, supra note 96, at 4 ("Federal forces would have no authority, for
example, to act as traffic controllers or provide security for facilities used in the relief
efforts, unless such activities serve a valid military purpose.").
166 Copelan & Lamb, supra note 160, at 38.
2006] 1257
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
a memorandum from the Department of Justice. 167 This uncertainty is a
problem because it passes the hard choices onto military commanders
without very much guidance.
At other times, the military could easily circumvent the PCA's
restrictions by correctly prioritizing their objectives. For example, although
the PCA prohibits soldiers from patrolling neighborhoods to stop looting,
troops may conduct patrols or sweeps if their primary purpose includes
delivery of food and supplies, search and rescue, or any of the other
provisions authorized under the Stafford Act. The presence of armed forces
is likely to stop looting in either scenario, but missions intended to advance a
valid military purpose may produce incidental benefits for law enforcement
officials. 168 These fine distinctions may preserve the purity of the PCA, but
they are not sound criteria for policymaking. A policy based on the necessity
of performing certain functions under the general banner of disaster relief
offers greater clarity and sounder criteria by which to regulate the actions of
military personnel.
C. Problems with Invoking the Insurrection Act
None of the distinctions between law enforcement and relief work matter
if the Insurrection Act is invoked. In response to Hurricane Katrina, federal
officials did not think troops could be sent in without confronting situations
requiring law enforcement capability. 69 The Insurrection Act was thus tossed
around in legal circles and throughout the media. However, authorization of
federal troops under the Stafford Act and the Insurrection Act could confuse
civilians, local and state authorities, as well as military officials with respect
to the role of deployed soldiers.
167 See, e.g., Lujan, supra note 108, at 84 ("Normally, DOD personnel may maintain
the security of DOD installations. However, the DOD Life Support Centers established in
Florida were inhabited almost entirely by civilians seeking relief. In light of Posse
Comitatus, National Guard and local law enforcement personnel, not active-duty soldiers,
were tasked to guard these sites."). The outcome would probably have been different if
the National Guard had not been available to provide security.
168 This is termed presence patrol, and was employed in Hurricane Katrina. Nate
Guidry, Sound Spirit Endure, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE (PENNSYLVANIA), Sept. 11,
2005, at Fl ("The 82nd Airborne ... was performing what the Army called 'presence
patrols,' for both the remaining residents and the criminal element that has emerged
during this disaster."); The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Send in the Military (PBS
television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005).
169 Lipton et al., supra note 66, at A22 ("Pentagon and military officials say that no
active-duty forces could have been sent into the chaos of New Orleans on Wednesday or
Thursday without confronting law-and-order challenges.").
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The government's response to the Los Angeles riots shows how
confusion may arise under the Insurrection Act in a way relevant to disaster
relief efforts. After the riots appeared to exceed the capacity of local
authorities, Governor Peter Wilson called in the California National Guard.
170
Under the control of the Governor, the restrictions of the PCA did not apply
to the National Guard, and units actively participated in law enforcement
activities. 71 Concerned with the lack of security and in an attempt to restore
law and order, state and local officials requested federal assistance. 172 After
the Insurrection Act was invoked, support came in the form of a Joint Task
Force consisting of Marines, Army soldiers, and a now "federalized"
National Guard.
173
Generally, when the President federalizes the National Guard, the Guard
becomes subject to the provisions of the PCA. 174 This seems to have been on
the mind of the General in charge of the federal troops, including the
federalized Guard, when he refused many missions based on what appeared
to be uncertainties regarding the activities permitted by the PCA.
171
However, since the President committed the troops under a statutory
exception to the PCA, no such restrictions existed at the time. 176 Some
uncertainty may have been caused by the fact that law and order seemed
largely restored by the time federal troops rolled in, leaving the commanders
reluctant to actively police civilians during a time of relative calm. 1
77
170 Kurt Andrew Schlichter, Comment, Locked and Loaded: Taking Aim at the
Growing Use of the American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 26 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1993) (offering a critical analysis of the military's role in
domestic disturbance, with emphasis on the riots in Los Angeles).
171 Lujan, supra note 108, at 89.
172 CURRIER, supra note 11, at 12.
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
175 Id.; Lujan, supra note 108, at 90.
176 CURRIER, supra note 11, at 10.
177 Does the exception cease automatically when the extraordinary circumstances
cease, or upon the command of the President or federal official? Nothing in recent
jurisprudence speaks to this question directly. But cf Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of
Columbia, 353 F. Supp 1249, 1255 (D.D.C. 1973) ("[T]he decision whether to use troops
or the militia (National Guard) in quelling a civil disorder is exclusively within the
province of the President."), affd 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1021 (1974). Although this would seem to suggest that the Insurrection Act exception to
the PCA lasts as long as the President determines, the court in Monarch was answering
whether federal officials were negligent in not invoking the Act. See 32 C.F.R § 501.6
(2005) ("[C]ivil disturbance operations should end as soon as the necessity therefore [sic]
ceases and the normal civil processes can be restored. Determination of the end of the
necessity will be made by the Department of the Army."). This regulation seems odd in
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Invoking the Insurrection Act in the larger context of a disaster increases
the chance for similar confusion. After receiving orders to restore law and
order, military commanders may arrive in trouble spots only to find that
some sense of order has been restored, either by state and local officials or
because the source of the disturbance died down on its own. As happened in
the Los Angeles riots, troops and officials might be uncertain about the
extent of the support they may provide to civilian law enforcement officials.
In other instances, it is not clear how the Act could be properly invoked, as
the President must issue a proclamation before invoking the Act notifying
"insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited
time."'178 This cease-and-disperse notice requirement makes no sense if the
objective is military control of traffic or the security of shelters and relief
centers, yet the Insurrection Act may not be invoked without such notice.
Besides technical incongruities, the Insurrection Act might prove too
much in the context of disaster response. The power flowing to the military
from the task of quelling insurrections and mass violence forces it to assume
a highly confrontational stance. 179 This position might not be optimal in
situations where the need for law and order is coupled with, and secondary
to, the need for humanitarian relief. Just because the military might need to
manage traffic, direct civilians, or secure relief centers does not mean it
should be deployed under a statute more attuned to violent uprisings and
widespread efforts to disrupt the operation of law.' 80 Even in the worst-case
scenario of mass looting and violence, there is a notable difference between
restoring order in disaster-stricken areas and enforcing the law after the
outbreak of riots like those in Los Angeles, or enforcing the civil rights of
black students.181 There, the conditions calling for military law enforcement
that it initially gives objective criteria for ending military operations, but then gives the
executive branch sole power to determine when to end operations.
178 10 U.S.C. § 334 (2000).
179 See Schlichter, supra note 170, at 1292, 1302-06 (highlighting some of the
dangers of the Insurrection Act).
180 Another reason the Insurrection Act might be inappropriate surfaced in reporting
on the stories of the breakdown of law and order. In hindsight, stories of mass violence
and disorder appear to have been untrue or exaggerated. Matt Welch, They Shoot
Helicopters, Don't They? How Journalists Spread Rumors During Katrina, REASON,
Dec. 1, 2005, at 16-18 (discussing some of the exaggerations along with how such stories
might originate and spread); Jim Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime's
Reality in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at Al; Christopher Shea, Up for
Grabs: Sociologists Question How Much Looting and Mayhem Really Took Place in New
Orleans, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2005, at El.
181 Shea, supra note 180, at El, E5 (quoting sociologists and experts on crowds
whose work shows clear differences between riot- and disaster-related looting and
violence). For a study of crowd behavior, see generally CLARK MCPHAIL, THE MYTH OF
THE MADDING CROWD (199 1).
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grew out of discontent with certain policies or practices. 8 2 Handing out food
and water, or providing shelter and medical attention, would not have solved
anything. Where disorder is a by-product of disaster, rapid and effective
disaster relief may often obviate much of the need for coercive force.
As the name suggests, the Insurrection Act contemplates heavy-handed
military tactics in order to quell threats to the legitimacy of state and federal
governments. 8 3 The primary objective of the military under the Stafford Act
is disaster relief.184 The Insurrection Act pits the military directly against the
citizens in a situation where humanitarian relief should take precedence over
law enforcement. For these reasons, political officials shy away from
invoking the Insurrection Act even when it might be legally permissible,
18 5
and would find it hard to invoke the Act for the purpose of traffic control or
securing shelters of disaster victims. 8 6 Ironically, by granting the military so
much power, the Insurrection Act grants them too little, as it suggests
overkill and often fits poorly into primarily disaster relief missions.
V. LAW AND ORDER AS DISASTER RELIEF
The laws governing domestic military use in a disaster give the military,
by way of the executive branch, a great deal of power in disasters; yet, that
power derives from a patchwork of statutes and regulations. This creates
opportunity for confusion and uncertainty in times where there is already an
abundance of both. Currently, regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
activities are outside the scope of the military's disaster response mission. 
l 7
This generally prohibits the military from controlling traffic, securing relief
centers, and restoring law and order during civil disturbances. 8 8 In many
disasters, state and local authorities can adequately provide these functions.
However, if these authorities prove or appear inadequate, governors should
have the power to request traffic control or security services as part of-and
18 2 See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 171-72 (1999) (connecting police tactics with unwillingness
to comply with the law); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1400-
01, 1403 (2005). Nadler explains the Los Angeles riots, and other such urban riots, as
fueled by unlawful government actions. Id. at 1439-40.
183 See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
185 The Insurrection Act also carries historical baggage that complicates the
decision-making process. See Lipton et al., supra note 66, at A22; see also supra note 68.
186 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 35-49, 99-109 and accompanying text.
188 ELSEA, supra note 96, at 4; Banks, supra note 136, at 760; Copelan & Lamb,
supra note 160, at 38.
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limited to-the overall disaster response. Instead of relying on ill-fitted
exceptions and fine distinctions, necessary military activities should fall
under the statutory framework of the Stafford Act. This realignment would
clarify the rules under which the military operates during emergencies and
disasters.1
89
A. Disaster Relief Exceptions to the PCA
The provision for military assistance would not automatically activate
after emergency or major disaster declarations, but would work much like
other forms of military assistance under the Stafford Act. When governors
need the military to remove debris or distribute food and medical supplies,
they specifically include it in the request for disaster relief and emergency
declarations. 90 The governor could also request traffic control or security
when disasters surpass or reasonably threaten to surpass the state's capacity.
The military's primary focus remains humanitarian relief, but providing
relief may necessitate the exercise of power that is regulatory, proscriptive,
or compulsory in nature. For instance, state executives might request delivery
of food and medical supplies or removal of debris in disasters without the
ability to provide security for all affected victims or military personnel.
This can happen if officials request active-duty forces before enough
National Guard members are available to them, or the Guard is federalized,
unable, or otherwise occupied. Under these conditions, the military may be
reluctant to take on relief missions where it foresees a high probability of
having to set up road blocks, control traffic, or restore order.1 9 Scenarios like
189 Ultimately, it would be clearer for civilian and military leaders if the exceptions
were incorporated into the Posse Comitatus Act. For one such proposal, see Hammond,
supra note 12, at 980-81. But this is beyond the scope of this Note, which only addresses
potential exceptions in major disasters and emergencies.
190 Title 42, § 5170b of the United States Code provides for essential assistance,
which includes military debris removal and search and rescue missions. That provision
also provides thus:
During the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately qualify
for assistance under this subchapter or subchapter IV-A of this chapter, the
Governor of the State in which such incident occurred may request the President to
direct the Secretary of Defense to utilize the resources of the Department of Defense
for the purpose of performing on public and private lands any emergency work
which is made necessary by such incident ....
42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
191 See, e.g., Lipton et al., supra note 66, at A22 ("Pentagon and military officials
say that no active-duty forces could have been sent ... without confronting law-and-
order challenges.").
1262 [Vol. 67:1227
TROOPS HOME TO A DISASTER
this, which do not always fit easily into the Insurrection Act, 192 could be met
by allowing state officials the statutory option of coupling essential law
enforcement with the mission. What constitutes essential law enforcement
would be determined on a case-by-case basis, but the concept seeks to
incorporate two policies. The first policy is that of states and local officials as
first responders. The second is the relief-centered nature of the mission.
Thus, only where states are unable to adequately provide for the security and
safety of disaster victims and responders-and the military's relief mission
necessitates the particular form of law enforcement-would the request be
appropriate.
B. Posse Comitatus Act's Rationale Revisited
Housing exceptions to the PCA within the Stafford Act certainly would
facilitate military law enforcement in certain disasters and emergencies, but it
would not greatly expand its current power. This is because the law
governing domestic military use already gives a great deal of power to state
and federal officials in responding to overwhelming disasters.' 93 Any
reluctance on the part of officials to use the military to the extent currently
permitted by law reflects traditional unease with military solutions to
domestic problems and the concurrent threat to civil liberties. This policy
would continue to influence decisions involving the military in domestic
affairs. But this policy is not and never has been absolute., 94 Under the
disaster exceptions to the PCA, the military already provides disaster relief, a
military solution to a domestic problem, because of the need to prevent
unnecessary loss of life and property. Moreover, unlike some exceptions to
the PCA, the Stafford Act exceptions would be expressly limited in time and
192 See discussion supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
193 But the practical application of this power is less certain. See Banks, supra note
136, at 773-74.
On the issue of whether the military could be deployed without the invitation of
state officials, the Office of Legal Counsel, the unit within the Justice Department
that provides legal advice to federal agencies, concluded that the federal government
had authority to move in even over the objection of local officials.
Lipton et al., supra note 66, at A22; see also Yoo, supra note 6.
194 See generally Richard H. Kohn, Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today,
and Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 165 (2003) (offering an historical account of domestic
military use).
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scope. 195 There is no threat of creating a national police force, or of
militarizing routine police activities.
Another rationale for the PCA emphasizes that military personnel are
trained to win wars and conduct missions against enemies, not to keep the
peace. This poses a slightly different objection to incorporating law.
enforcement into the disaster response effort. Admittedly, combat-oriented
training lacks most of the nuances and constitutional safeguards of police
training. However, the disaster relief exceptions do not hold out the military
as the best option but as the last resort. Arguably, subjecting law enforcement
activities to the necessity of providing disaster relief better addresses the
problem than the current law, which could authorize military law
enforcement independent of the disaster relief effort. At least in the former
scenario there would be less uncertainty about the principal goal of any
particular mission.
VI. CONCLUSION
Amidst disaster relief, the dual tasks of providing relief and providing
security are not always easy to separate. While the Posse Comitatus Act
requires this distinction, laws today do not require an absolute separation
between the two. This is evidenced by state forces like the National Guard, to
which the PCA does not apply, and the various exceptions to the PCA.
Considering the ability to piece together various exceptions, executive
officials cannot truly say they are powerless to save lives and property during
a disaster because of restrictions on the military, even if that response
includes law enforcement. However, the work of piecing together the
applicable law in times of disaster introduces uncertainty that is unhelpful to
the military and civilians. Incorporating exceptions to the PCA into the
Stafford Act's provisions for essential assistance is one way the legislature
could clarify this area of law and thus possibly improve the delivery of relief
and security in catastrophic disasters.
195 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c) (2000) (limiting the utilization of DOD resources for
essential assistance to ten days).
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